The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court by Gianaris, William N.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 1 1992 Article 3
The New World Order and the Need for an
International Criminal Court
William N. Gianaris∗
∗
Copyright c©1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The New World Order and the Need for an
International Criminal Court
William N. Gianaris
Abstract
This Article contends that the current status of international law enforcement is inadequate to
address the newly emergent problems of international crime and that new measures are needed.
Part I briefly reviews the historical background of international cooperation in the field of law
enforcement, including past attempts to form an international criminal court. Part II describes
and analyzes the current status of international law enforcement, including the most recent and
extensive attempt to increase the level of cooperation in the field of international drug trafficking,
the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Part III addresses the reasons why the current level of international cooperation is inadequate to
deal with the problems posed by the degree and magnitude of international crime today. Part IV
propounds the hypothesis that an international criminal court, strengthened with strict enforcement
measures, would be able to better address these problems and better deal with international crime.
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INTRODUCTION
As the world changes at a rapid pace, so do the needs and
opportunities for the international community to come to-
gether to address its newly emerging problems. The bur-
geoning scope and increasing magnitude of international
crime pose a problem that requires an international response.
* Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, N.Y.; LL.M. International Legal
Studies, New York University; J.D., Fordham University. The author wishes to ex-
press his special thanks to Professor Ronald Noble and Laura Cecere for their assist-
ance in the preparation of this Article.
1. By "international crime," I am referring to the more traditional crimes nor-
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Drug trafficking and terrorism have been and remain the most
serious and damaging of all international crimes, but more
complex and subtle crimes such as money laundering, securi-
ties and bank fraud, and white collar crime are quickly increas-
ing in frequency and magnitude.2 The United States' inability
to prosecute known and indicted criminals due to another na-
tion's inability or unwillingness to cooperate evinces the inter-
national community's need to address this problem more ade-
quately.' The recent failure of the United States to secure the
extradition and prosecution of the Libyan citizens, Abdel Bas-
set Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, allegedly re-
sponsible for the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, because of the lack of Libyan coop-
mally committed by individuals that are part of most countries' criminal penal codes,
such as drug trafficking, terrorism, counterfeiting, fraud, and white collar crime,
which are committed on a transnational level, i.e. where the criminal activity occurs in
more than one nation or substantially affects nation(s) other than the one where the
criminal activity occurred. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CRIMES 1-14, 24-25 (1986) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, ICL: CRIMES] (delineating such
crimes); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.) (describing transnational crimes more
fully), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFt INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRI-
BUNAL 41-59 (1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DRAFr CODE] (describing traditional
crimes (delicts) and other non-traditional international crimes over which interna-
tional criminal court can have jurisdiction). This Article will not deal with the more
political international crimes normally committed by a state or agents of a state, such
as aggression, war crimes, environmental crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
torture, or unlawful use of weapons. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra. While an inter-
national criminal court could and should eventually deal with both types of crimes, it
does not appear feasible that countries would be willing to allow an international
criminal court to hear such types of political cases which could also be dealt with in a
non-criminal fashion and by other international organizations. While this Article
will confine itself to the more "traditional" types of crimes, other less "traditional"
types of crimes can also be dealt with in a similar fashion in the future. It is con-
tended that an international criminal court can initially exercise jurisdiction over the
crimes of international drug trafficking, terrorism, and certain economic crimes.
2. See Lisa L. Davis & Bruce Zagaris, International Cooperation in a World Market-
place: Preventing & Prosecuting Commodity Futures Fraud &Abuses, 15 NOVA L. REv. 507
(1991) (describing problems in countering international scale commodity futures
crimes); Michael A. DeFeo, Depriving International Narcotics Traffickers and Other Organ-
ized Criminals of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money Laundering, 18 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 405 (1990) (explaining challenge to law enforcement of money laundering).
3. John B. Anderson, An International Criminal Court-An Emerging Idea, 15 NOVA
L. REV. 433 (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on Interna-
tional Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression of International and Transna-
tional Criminality, 15 NOVA L. REV. 353, 357 (1991) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Comprehen-
sive Strategic Approach].
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eration, exemplifies this current international deficiency.4 An
international criminal court would provide a neutral interna-
tional forum to which the Libyan authorities would be more
likely to surrender the two indicted suspects for prosecution.5
In addition to facilitating such jurisdictional problems, the cre-
ation of an international criminal court with strict enforcement
measures, such as economic sanctions against non-cooperative
nations and the possible use of an international police force
where necessary, would also generate greater international co-
operation and success in law enforcement.
While attempts to create such a court have failed in the
past, the current political and social conditions all give new in-
ternational impetus to the creation of such a forum. Such con-
ditions include the large increase in the breadth and complex-
ity of international crime, the increased position of strength of
the United States and the Western law-abiding democratic na-
tions arising from the end of the cold war, and the collapse of
the Soviet empire. An international criminal court with juris-
diction over international narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and
international economic crimes that threaten the stability of the
world's economy would provide such a forum.
This Article contends that the current status of interna-
tional law enforcement is inadequate to address the newly
4. Chris Hedges, More Sanctions May Be the Way to Push Libya, Mideast Aides Say,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, § 1, at 10; David Johnston, U.S. and British Demand the Two
Libyans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28 1991, at A3; Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes to Prohibit
Arms Exports & Flights to Libya, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at Al; Qaddafi Rejects U.N.
Demands on Bomb Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, § 1, at 13; Andrew Rosenthal,
U.S. Accuses Libya as Two are Charged in Pan Am Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at
Al. Because of the duration and the impact of the sanctions, Libyan and Arab sup-
port for Qaddafi seems to be wavering. See Council to Maintain Sanctions on Libya,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1992, at A19 (reporting that U.N. Security Council agreed to
continue the sanctions, banning air links and military sales originally imposed on
April 15, 1992); Caryle Murphy, Arab States Said to Press Libya to Extradite Bomb Suspects,
WASH. POST, June 7, 1992, at A29 (reporting that Egyptians implored Tripoli to sur-
render suspects to avoid imposition of stiffer economic sanctions); see also Caryle
Murphy, Two Libyan Newspapers Attack Gadhafi Policies; Pursuit of Arab Unity Called A 'Mi-
rage', WASH. PosT, June 11, 1992, at A18 (reporting that Libyan newspapers are criti-
cizing Qaddafi's decision not to extradite suspects to U.S. or Britain).
5. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Dismisses Libyan Offer on Neutral Trial Site for Bomb Sus-
pects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at A10. The greater likelihood for Libya's turning
over the two suspects to such a court can be seen by the statement of Libyan Foreign
Minister Ibrahim Bishari that the Libyan government would be willing to turn the
two men over to be tried "in front of a neutral court in any neutral country." Id.
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emergent problems of international crime and that new meas-
ures are needed. Part I briefly reviews the historical back-
ground of international cooperation in the field of law enforce-
ment, including past attempts to form an international criminal
court. Part II describes and analyzes the current status of in-
ternational law enforcement, including the most recent and ex-
tensive attempt to increase the level of cooperation in the field
of international drug trafficking, the 1988 U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances.6 Part III addresses the reasons why the current level
of international cooperation is inadequate to deal with the
problems posed by the degree and magnitude of international
crime today. Part IV propounds the hypothesis that an inter-
national criminal court, strengthened with strict enforcement
measures, would be able to better address these problems and
better deal with international crime. This Article, therefore,
concludes that the time has arrived to establish such a fully-
empowered international criminal court to deal with today's
level of international crime.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LA W
ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND THE
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
Nations' attempts to cooperate in law enforcement and to
combat international crimes date back to the 19th century. In
1815, the Congress of Vienna sought to abolish slavery. 7 Na-
6. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15 and rev. 1 (adopted by consensus, Dec. 19,
1988) [hereinafter 1988 U.N. Convention], reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); see A
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE DRFT, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND ISSUES
FOR THE SENATE, S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also REPORT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMrrrEE, S. EXEC. REP. No. 15, 101st Cong, 1st Sess. (1989)
[hereinafter S. EXEC. REP.] (reporting favorably subject to certain understandings).
The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on Nov. 6, 1989, and the U.S.
instrument of ratification was deposited with the United Nations on Feb. 20, 1990.
David P. Stewart, Internationalizing The War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 387
(1990) (commenting specifically on convention's implications for international crimi-
nal law).
7. Anderson, supra note 3; BASSIOUNI, ICL: CRIMES, supra note 1, at 22; Bas-
siouni, Comprehensive Strategic Approach, supra note 3, at 356.
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tions also negotiated subsequent numerous bilateral extradi-
tion treaties to deal with fleeing criminals.8 One such treaty,
signed by the United States and Colombia, was the 1888 Con-
vention for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals. 9 Signa-
tory nations did not always fully abide by these treaties and
non-signatory nations often offered safe havens for fleeing
criminals, thereby often rendering extradition treaties porous
and ineffective. 10
The beginning decades of the 20th century saw greater at-
tempts by nations to combat transnational crimes through
multilateral treaties." Conventions signed included the 1910
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene
Publications, 12 the Hague International Opium Convention of
1912,'1 the Geneva International Opium Convention of
8. Roger S. Clark, Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation in the Criminal
Process, 15 NOVA L. REV. 475,476 (1991) (commenting that most of such treaties were
bilateral); Mark A. Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition,
and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NovA L. REV. 661, 670 (1991).
9. Sherman, supra note 8, at 670. Notably, this convention did not deal with
illicit drug trafficking, thereby making it almost useless today.
10. Clark, supra note 8, at 476; see Abraham Abramovsky, The Political Offense Ex-
ception and the Extradition Process: The Enhancement of the Role of the U.S. Judiciary, 13
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989) (explaining evolving judicial interpreta-
tions by U.S. courts of exceptions to extradition treaties, notably political offense
exception). The United States and the United Kingdom expanded the crimes cov-
ered by their extradition treaties to attempt to ensure that Irish Republican Army
terrorists could not seek safe haven in the United States. Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 24 I.L.M. 1105-09 (1985).
11. Clark, supra note 8, at 476-77. These treaties include the International
Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, Mar. 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S.
83; the Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications,
May 4, 1910, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil G~nral de Trait~s (ser. 3) 266; the Interna-
tional Opium Convention,Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187; the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, opened
for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415; the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene Publications, opened for signature
Sept. 12, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 213; the International Convention Adopted by the Sec-
ond Opium Conference and Protocol Relating Thereto ("Geneva International
Opium Convention"), Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317; and the International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, April 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S.
371.
12. May 4, 1910, 37 Stat. 1511, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil G~nral de Trait~s
(ser. 3) 266.
13. Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 6 AM.J. INT'L L. 177
(Supp. 1912). This was the first international narcotics convention.
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1925,t4 the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Reg-
ulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931,'" and the
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Danger-
ous Drugs of 1936.16
More significantly, in 1924, the International Association
of Penal Law ("IAPL") was established in Paris.' 7 By 1926, the
IAPL supported criminal jurisdiction for the Permanent Court
of International Justice of the League of Nations.' 8 In 1937,
the League of Nations sponsored a conference on interna-
tional criminal law in Geneva, Switzerland that resulted in the
promulgation of the Convention for the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Terrorism and for the Creation of an International
Criminal Court. 19
After World War II, the newly created United Nations ap-
pointed the Special Committee of the General Assembly to
draft a statute for the formation of an International Criminal
Court that resulted in the production of the Draft Statute in
1951.20 Two years later, in response to reservations of U.N.
member states,2 ' the U.N. 1953 Committee on International
14. Feb. 19, 1925, 8i L.N.T.S. 317, reprinted in 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 135 (Supp.
1929). Under this Convention, governments were required to submit annual statis-
tics within quarterly reports with regard to opium, coca leaves, and narcotic drugs to
the newly created Permanent Central Opium Board. Id.
15. July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, 139 L.N.T.S. 301, reprinted in 28 AM.J. INT'L L.
21 (Supp. 1934); Quincy Wright, The Narcotics Convention of 1931, 28 AM.J. INT'L. L.
475 (1934). This Convention tried to limit the quantities of drugs available in each
country and territory so as to have enough only for medical and scientific needs. Id.
16. June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299; J.G. Starke, The Convention of 1936 for the
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 31 AM. J. Irr'L L. 31 (1937). This
treaty attempted to prevent the avoidance of prosecution and facilitate extradition of
drug offenders. Id.
17. Robert A. Friedlander, The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present-
Day Inquiry, 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 13, 18 (1983).
18. Id. at 18-19; Richard Jescheck, Development, Present State and Future Prospects of
International Criminal Law, 52 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 337 (1981).
19. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 19; BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 269-398 (1980). The Convention on terrorism was, however, only signed
by India and the Convention for an international criminal court was not signed by
any nation. FERENCZ, supra, at 54; Friedlander, supra note 17, at 19.
20. Draft Statute for An International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 31, 1951) U.N. GAOR, 7th
Sess,, Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951 Report and Draft Stat-
ute]; see BASSIOUNI, DRAFr CODE, supra note 1, at 6-7 (commenting that this Draft
Statute was in part modeled after International Court of Justice).
21. 1951 Report and Draft Statute, supra note 20, 60-110 (describing jurisdic-
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Criminal Jurisdiction revised this 1951 Draft Statute with a re-
port, the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court
("1953 Draft Statute").22
The 1953 Draft Statute provided for the establishment of
an international criminal court "to try natural persons accused
of crimes generally recognized under international law. ' 2"
The court could obtain jurisdiction by convention, by special
agreement, or by unilateral decision,24 and only where the
state instituting the proceedings had conferred jurisdiction
upon the court over the offenses involved.25 The court also
could ask national authorities to assist in the performance of its
duties to the extent the nation being asked had agreed. 26 The
1953 Draft Statute also provided for a five-judge Committing
Chamber to examine the evidence offered by the complainant
and to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the complaint. 27 The 1953 Draft Statute also provided for
a prosecuting attorney to be appointed for the complainant
who would file an indictment based on the findings certified by
the Committing Chamber.28 While the 1953 Draft Statute did
not provide for a right to trial by jury, 29 the defendant was pre-
sumed innocent and accorded many rights equivalent to U.S.
constitutional rights.3 ° The court also would have had the
tional aspects of this proposal). Many states were unwilling to surrender their na-
tional sovereignty to an international criminal court to the extent provided for by the
1951 Draft Statute. Id.; BAssIoUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 7; FERENCZ, supra
note 19, at 365-71.
22. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, (Annex to the Report of
the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954) [hereinafter 1953 Draft Statute]; see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: ENFORCEMENT 7-8 (1987) [herein-
after BASSIOUNI, ICL: ENFORCEMENT].
23. 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 22, art. 1.
24. Id. art. 26(2).
25. Id. art. 29.
26. Id. art. 31.
27. Id. art. 33.
28. Id. art. 34.
29. Id. art. 37. Trials would be without jury unless otherwise provided in the
instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the court. At least seven of the 15 judges
could render a verdict if no jury was provided. Id. art. 44.
30. Id. art. 38. Such U.S. constitutional rights include the right to be present at
all stages of the proceeding, the right to a defense, the right to an attorney, the right
to discovery, the right to cross-examine, and the right to speak in one's own defense
or to remain silent without inference being drawn from this silence. Id.
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power to issue arrest warrants"' and set bail.3 2
In 1954, the 1953 Draft Statute was followed by a Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
prepared by the International Law Commission, that listed
thirteen separate international crimes.3 3 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the states involved were never able to come to an agree-
ment and sign either this Draft Statute or the Draft Code into
existence. This was due in large part to their inability to agree
on what constituted an act of "aggression," which act was
made illegal by Article 2(1) of this Draft Code.3 4 Thus, due
mainly to the political considerations involved in defining a
state's "act of aggression," the states involved have to date
been unable to pass the 1953 Draft Statute and 1954 Draft
Code, thus making the establishment of an international crimi-
nal court impossible.3 5
While states adopted neither the 1953 Draft Statute on an
international criminal court nor the 1954 Draft Code, states
entered into numerous treaties in the post-World War II era
that stressed greater international cooperation in law enforce-
ment, particularly in the areas of international drug trafficking
and terrorism. In the field of international drug trafficking, a
1953 U.N. Protocol sought to limit the agricultural production
of the opium poppy to the amount needed for medical use. 6
In 1961, however, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
("Single Convention")3 7 was adopted and virtually replaced all
existing multilateral narcotics treaties.3 1 While the Single
31. Id. art. 40.
32. Id. art. 41.
33. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9,
at 9, U.N. Doc A/2693 (1954) (listing 13 violations of international law for which
those responsible would be punished).
34. Id. art. 2(1); see FERENCZ, supra note 19, at 41-48 (commenting on disagree-
ment over what aggression entailed).
35. BASSIOUNI, DRAftr CODE, supra note 1, at 8-11; see FERENCZ, supra note 19, at
41-48 (commenting on disagreement over what aggression entailed).
36. June 23, 1953, Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of
Opium, U.N. Doc. E./N.T./8 (1953).
37. Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Single Con-
vention] (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964, for the United States June 24, 1967).
38. Id.; S. EXEC. REP., supra note 6, at 154-55; Jeffrey L. Harding, International
Narcotics Control A Proposal to Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
530, 544 (1984). This Convention was ratified by more than half of the members of
the United Nations. S. EXEC. REP., supra note 6, at 154. The Convention created the
1992-19931
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Convention was a major development because of the extent
and scope of its adoption, its many weaknesses rendered it
somewhat ineffective. These weaknesses included its lack of
effective international cooperation measures (cooperation de-
pended upon nations' voluntary actions), of authority given to
the international narcotics control bodies, of obligations and
incentives for preventing the overproduction of drugs, of in-
ternational enforcement mechanisms, and of international
sanctions for individual offenders.39
In 1971, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances was
enacted.4 ° This Convention, largely modeled after the 1961
Single Convention, adopted strict international controls for
psychotropic substances such as LSD and mescaline.4 ' Fur-
thermore, in 1972, the Geneva Protocol Amending the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs ("1972 Protocol") was
adopted.4 2 This Protocol, while still relying on nations' volun-
tary cooperation, increased the competence of the previously
created International Narcotics Control Board. The 1972 Pro-
tocol also expanded the scope and effectiveness of extradition,
technical assistance, drug treatment, rehabilitation, and pre-
ventive measures. 43 The attempt, however, to control interna-
tional drug trafficking reached its culmination in the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, 44 the most far-reaching convention
in the field of international narcotics control and law enforce-
ment cooperation.
Moreover, in the early 1970s a series of conventions were
adopted to combat international terrorism. These conventions
include the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
International Narcotics Control Board which superseded and replaced the Perma-
nent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. Id. at 155. While it did
not replace the 1936 Convention, supra note 16, with the exception of extradition, it
did adopt similar provisions. Id.; Harding, supra, at 544 n.130.
39. See S. ExEC. REP., supra note 6, at 155 (commenting on weakness of Single
Convention).
40. Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175.
41. Id.; see S. EXEC. REP., supra note 6, at 155-60; Harding, supra note 38, at 546.
42. Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1972 Protocol]
(entered into force Aug. 8, 1975).
43. Id. arts. 2-9, 14-16; S. EXEC. REP., supra note 6, at 160-61; Harding, supra
note 38, at 546-47.
44. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6.
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Seizure of Aircraft,45 the 1971 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,46 and the
1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages ("1979 Convention").47  The 1979 Convention at-
tempted to foster greater cooperation in the prevention and
prosecution of terrorist offenses.48 It mandated that a state
shall be obliged either to extradite or to prosecute an individ-
ual who committed an offense.4 9 The 1979 Convention's effec-
tiveness, however, was greatly weakened by a number of ex-
ceptions that enabled states to avoid extradition or prosecu-
tion.50 Furthermore, although the 1979 Convention provided
for the submission of any disputes to arbitration and to the
International Court of Justice, it was further limited by provi-
sions allowing each state the right to renounce the 1979 Con-
vention by written notification and by providing no methods to
deal with recalcitrant states.5 '
The series of European Conventions5 2 as well as the
Model Treaties that were adopted by the United Nations from
1985 to 1990 are also worthy of mention.53 These Conven-
45. Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133
(1971) (entered into force, Oct. 14, 1971).
46. Sep. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151
(1971) (entered into force Jan 26, 1973)
47. G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/C6/
34/46 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) (entered into force June 3, 1983, for
United States Dec. 7, 1984).
48. Id. arts. 1-5.
49. Id. art. 8.
50. Id. art. 9. Such exceptions included situations where the State felt that the
request for extradition was made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a per-
son because of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or
because the person's position might be prejudiced. Id.
51. Id. art. 16.
52. These European Conventions include the 1957 Convention on Extradition,
Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, Europ. T.S. No. 24; the 1959 Convention on Mu-
tual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185; the 1970 Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, May 28,
1970, 973 U.N.T.S. 57, Europ. T.S. No. 70; the 1972 European Convention on the
Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, May 15, 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 73; and
the 1977 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S.
No. 90; see BASSIOUNI, ICL: CRIMES, supra note 3, at 97-99 (commenting on level of
international cooperation attempted by these conventions).
53. See The Model Agreement on the Transfer of Prisoners (Report of the 7th U.N. Cong. on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/22/Rev 1,
at 53 (1986); The Model Treaty on Extradition (Report of the 8th U.N. Cong. on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28, at. 71 (1990); The
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tions and treaties were particularly significant because they at-
tempted to establish a uniform criminal justice system whereby
signatory nations cooperated in the fields of investigation, evi-
dence gathering, enforcement, and prosecution.54
II. THE 1988 U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT
TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THE
CURRENT STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL LA W ENFORCEMENT
A. International Narcotics Trafficking
In 1988, the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (" 1988 U.N. Conven-
tion") 55 was adopted at an international conference of 106
states, including the United States.56 The 1988 U.N. Conven-
tion marked a significant development in the international
community's fight against international drug trafficking by ex-
plicitly recognizing illicit drug trafficking as an international
criminal activity, 57 and requiring each signatory state to estab-
lish legislation outlawing the production, possession, transpor-
tation, or distribution of listed narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances. 58  The 1988 U.N. Convention additionally re-
quired signatory states to criminalize the following drug-re-
lated activities: money laundering; the acquisition, possession,
or use of property knowingly derived from drug trafficking; the
possession of equipment or materials used in producing or
manufacturing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; and
the conspiracy, participation, or aiding and abetting any of the
Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Id. at 82; The Model Treaty on the
Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters. Id. at 96; The Model Treaty on the Transfer of
Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released. Id. at 103; The
Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the
Form of Movable Property. Id. at 110; see Clark, supra note 8, at 475-500 (describing
such treaties more fully).
54. See supra notes 52-53 (listing European conventions and U.N. Model Trea-
ties designed to facilitate and coordinate international criminal investigation and
prosecution).
55. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6.
56. Id.; Stewart, supra note 6, at 387.
57. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.; Stewart, supra note 6, at 387.
58. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
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above offenses.59 The 1988 U.N. Convention thus broadened
the scope of offenses covered to effectively combat interna-
tional drug traffickers who often never physically handle the
narcotics but organize, finance, supervise, and profit from in-
ternational drug trafficking." °
Additionally, the 1988 U.N. Convention specified the in-
stances in which the signatory states were required to establish
jurisdiction over the covered offenses6 and furnished the
power to confiscate all forms of property used in or derived
from the covered offenses.62 Furthermore, the 1988 U.N.
Convention postulated the cooperation between nations in the
confiscation of such property.63 The 1988 U.N. Convention
also stipulated the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in
the investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings with
regard to the listed criminal offenses. 64 This mutual assistance
embraced the following procedures: the taking of evidence or
statements from persons; service of judicial documents;
searches and seizures; examination of objects and sites; provid-
ing bank, financial, and business records and documents; and
identifying or tracing proceedings, property, instrumentalities,
59. Id.
60. S. EXEC. REP., supra note 6, at 161.
61. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 4. A state has jurisdiction basically
where (a) the offense is committed (i) in its territory or (ii) aboard a vessel flying its
flag or an aircraft which is registered under its laws at the time the offence is commit-
ted or (b) the offense is (i) committed by one of its nationals or by a person who has
his habitual residence in its territory or (ii) committed on board a vessel concerning
which that party has been authorized to take appropriate action pursuant to article 17
or (iii) one of those established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, subpara-
graph (c)(iv) (conspiracy) and is committed outside its territory with a view to the
commission within its territory. Id.
62. Id. art. 5. Parties are required to take all necessary measures to allow their
appropriate authorities to identify, trace, seize, or freeze property, proceeds, instru-
mentalities, or any other objects, or take preliminary steps towards the eventual con-
fiscation of that property. Id. art. 5(2).
63. Id. art. 5(4)(a). This article provides that the party in whose territory such
property is situated shall (i) submit the request to its competent authorities for the
purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect
to it; or (ii) submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to the
extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting party in accord-
ance with paragraph 1 of this article, in so far as it relates to proceeds, property,
instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 situated in the terri-
tory of the requested party. Id.
64. Id. art. 7.
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or other potential evidentiary objects.65
Regarding extradition, the 1988 U.N. Convention
amended existing signatory states' current extradition treaties
to incorporate these covered offenses as extraditable and made
the 1988 U.N. Convention a legal basis for extradition.66 The
states were also called upon to expedite, simplify, and enhance
the effectiveness of extradition proceedings.6 ' The 1988 U.N.
Convention provided that a state from which extradition of an
individual is requested but refused shall submit the case to its
own competent authorities should that state have jurisdic-
tion.68 The 1988 U.N. Convention states, however, that a state
may avoid extradition when substantial grounds reveal that the
person is being prosecuted on account of "race, religion, na-
tionality or political opinions," or extradition would cause
prejudice for any of those reasons.69
The 1988 U.N. Convention also required signatory states
to enhance cooperation and efforts to track and intercept illicit
narcotics trafficking,70 to eradicate plants containing narcotic
or psychotropic substances, 7 and to reduce the demand for
illicit drugs.' 2 Lastly, the 1988 U.N. Convention assigned to
the International Narcotics Board, established under the Sin-
gle Convention,' 3 and to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic
Drugs, broad supervisory responsibilities including the over-
sight of illicit manufacture and export of narcotic drugs,
psychotropic substances, and related materials and equipment,
as well as the publication of an annual report.'4 The 1988
U.N. Convention also permitted state parties to submit other-
wise unresolvable disputes to the International Court of Jus-
tice.7
65. Id. art. 7(2).
66. Id. art. 6(I)-(4).
67. Id. art. 6(7)-(11).
68. Id. art. 6(9).
69. Id. art. 6(6).
70. Id. arts. 7, 11, 12, 15 & 17.
71. Id. art. 14.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (describing Single Conven-
tion).
74. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, arts. 21-23.
75. Id. art. 32.
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B. International Economic Crimes
The area of international economic crimes also has several
recent, noteworthy developments. With the increased interde-
pendency and integration of the world's economies, the level
of international crime in the global marketplace has increased
dramatically.76 Such crime includes international investment
scams, money counterfeiting, and money laundering.
The various international investment scams include off-
shore boiler rooms,7 7 circumvention of foreign regulation,78
diversion of funds to foreign bank accounts,79 and interna-
tional market manipulation." National laws attempt to ad-
dress such scams and crimes, but an overall international ap-
proach is lacking.8 ' While the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission has jurisdiction over international commodity fu-
tures transactions with some connection to the United States,82
76. Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 511-12. "According to a 1990 study by the
North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) on international in-
vestment fraud and abuse, 'international investment swindles are now the fastest grow-
ing category offraud with which state securities agencies are dealing today.' " Id. at 511
(quoting NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADM'R Ass'N, 1990 STUDY ON INT'L INV. FRAUD
AND ABUSE (1990)). A recent example of this is the charges filed against the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") by the U.S. Department ofJustice and
the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. See Steve Lohr, Indictment Charges Clifford
Took Bribes-Broader Inquiry into BCCI Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at Al
(describing indictments). In this case, top officials and affiliates of BCCI were
charged with fraud, money laundering, and bribery of officials of ten different na-
tions. Id. This case has been characterized as "the largest financial fraud in history."
Id.
77. Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 512-14. "A boiler room is an enterprise
normally operated out of inexpensive low-rent quarters which uses high pressure
sales tactics with false or misleading information and which targets generally unso-
phisticated investors." Id. at 512 n. 11 (quoting COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COM-
MISSION, THE CFTC GLOSSARY: A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE FU-
TURES INDUSTRY (1990)).
78. Id. at 514-15. Circumvention of foreign regulation occurs when a foreign
company circumvents U.S. law by offering prohibited options for sale in the United
States. Id.
79. Id. at 515.
80. Id. at 516-17. International market manipulation is the manipulation of the
price of commodities or commodity futures contracts by way of illegal schemes. Id.
81. In the United States, for example, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion ("CFTC") regulates commodity futures and options exchanges in the United
States. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988); Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 518 n.41 (citing 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988)). The U.S. Department ofJustice is responsible for the prose-
cution of criminal violations. Id. at 519 n.48 (construing PHILIP M. JOHNSON &
THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 4.27, at 252 (1989)).
82. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988); Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 520 n.49. The U.S.
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prosecution of such crimes often requires the cooperation of
other nations controlling evidence of the crime or the criminal
himself. Furthermore, while the U.S. courts have held that
they have extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction for securi-
ties law violations where there is either substantial conduct
contributing to the criminal acts committed in the United
States or where fraudulent conduct committed outside of the
United States results in substantial deleterious effects inside
the United States, the effectiveness of such jurisdiction also de-
pends on other nations' collaboration.8 3
Existing international approaches require too much vol-
untary cooperation to be effective. While the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters84 provided for letters rogatory and the taking of evidence
by consular officials and private commissioners for the pur-
poses of international evidence gathering, such participation
depends on each nation's willingness to cooperate. 85 Informal
agreements8 6 usually mandate a greater degree of cooperation
between nations, but again these are entirely voluntary.8 ' Mu-
tual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATS") also provide for a
greater degree of law enforcement cooperation, but many of
these are unratified and riddled with gaps that hamper cooper-
ation.88 International organizations, such as the International
Organization of Security Commissions ("IOSCO"),8 9 also seek
courts have also interpreted this jurisdiction broadly. Id. at 522-24. E.g., Tamari v.
Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871
(1984); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
83. E.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638
(1991); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983); Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
84. Opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
85. Id. art. 23.
86. Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 532-33 (commenting that such informal
agreements include information sharing agreements and mutual assistance agree-
ments).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 543-44.
89. Id. at 544-48. The IOSCO was formed in 1984 as a predominantly educa-
tional organization and has evolved into a very influential international organization
that facilitates coordination and cooperation among the securities and commodities
regulators around the world. Id. at 545 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/NSIAD-89-115, INT'L FINANCE: REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS 18 (1989)).
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an international approach to the regulation of securities and
commodity futures markets.9" In 1986, IOSCO's members
adopted the "Rio Resolution," in which signatory nations
agreed to gather and share information relating to market sur-
veillance and customer protection.9' While there are many at-
tempts to cooperate on an international level in securities reg-
ulation and to prevent international commodity scams and
abuse, such schemes and abuses will grow as the world econ-
omy integrates unless nations classify them as international
crimes and enforce and prosecute them with a greater degree
of certainty.92
Another flourishing international crime, extensively em-
ployed especially by international drug traffickers, is money
laundering. 95  Drug traffickers and other criminals hoard and
accumulate their illegal profits and invest their savings
throughout the world. Tracing this money is often the sole
method of apprehending major criminals, whose involvement
would otherwise be impossible to detect,94 and confiscating
these assets debilitates the profitability of major crimes. While
abundant U.S. legislation combats money laundering, 95 inter-
national treaties and organizations did not effectively address
it until 1988. The 1988 U.N. Convention furnished the ability
to "confiscate" all proceeds from the covered illegal activities
and affirmatively obliged the signatory states to cooperate and
90. Id. (citing Guy, IOSCO Moves Ahead, F.I.A. REV. 8 (May/June 1990)).
91. Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 545-48. Other organizations include the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and the Wil-
ton Park Group. Davis & Zagaris, supra note 2, at 548-49.
92. Id. at 549.
93. Michael A. DeFeo, Depriving International Narcotics Traffickers and Other Organ-
ized Criminals of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money Laundering, 18 DENv. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 405 (1990); SaraJ. Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Fund Transfers: A
Critique of Regulation under the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283 (1992).
94. DeFeo, supra note 93, at 411. While major drug traffickers, for instance, may
insulate themselves from any connection to the drugs or contraband being distrib-
uted, they would most likely control or have some connection with the money and
assets generated by drug distribution. Id. at 410-11.
95. See, e.g., 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1988) and in
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (1988)); 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C. (1988)); 1986 Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 135 7 (g), 100
Stat. 3207-18, 3207-26 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317, 5322(b) (1988)).
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share with each other all relevant information and documents
from banks and other organizations. 96 Some states are not
able to enforce foreign criminal jurisdiction of forfeiture, how-
ever, which complicates the actual seizure of these assets.97 To
overcome this problem, the U.N. Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice Branch is preparing model treaties to structure a
basic framework for tracing and seizing illegal proceeds. 9 The
European Economic Community has also addressed the prob-
lem of money laundering in a convention and directive.99
C. Terrorism
Lastly, in combatting terrorism, although the treaties of
the 1970s provided a means for international cooperation, cer-
tain nations remain noncompliant. A recent example of this is
Libya's opposition to the extradition of two Libyan individuals
who were indicted in the United States for the 1988 bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland which killed 270 people.' 0
Promising action evolved from this refusal, however, when the
United Nations ordered the surrender of these two individuals
to either Britain or the United States and imposed economic
sanctions against Libya for noncompliance.' 0 ' The United Na-
tions' intervention in this instance placed some "teeth" into
the enforcement of an international treaty in the field of inter-
national criminal law.
Furthermore, while terrorism has been a violent and dis-
ruptive crime for several decades, international narcotics deal-
ers now also use it to control and to intimidate governments
that oppose them. 0 2 This presents the frightening problem of
96. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, arts. 5, 7; Stewart, supra note 6, at 395.
97. Stewart, supra note 6, at 396.
98. DeFeo, supra note 93, at 413.
99. Council of Europe: Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991);
Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering, No. 91/308, OJ. L 166 (1991); see Jeffrey L. Quillen, Note, The
International Attack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 213 (1991).
100. See supra note 4 (discussing Libya's opposition to extradition efforts).
101. See supra note 4 (discussing U.N. reaction to Libyan hostility).
102. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, 1991 REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL NARCOTICs CONTROL BOARD 39 (1991) [hereinafter U.N. REP.]; Faiza Patel,
Crime Without Frontiers: A Proposalfor an International Narcotics Court, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 709, 713 (1990); Bruce Zagaris, Protecting the Rule of Law from Assault in the
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the use of terrorism, not by dispossessed ethnic groups or zeal-
ots, but by well-financed and superbly organized criminals with
the resources and the tenacity to go to almost any extreme to
maintain their billion-dollar drug industry. This is a frighten-
ing thought with serious and deadly possibilities. Clearly, the
international community must act to eradicate these criminals
before their power grows even more.
III. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL LA W ENFORCEMENT
The inadequacy of the current system of international law
enforcement can be seen by the growth in narcotics trafficking
and use, despite the 1988 U.N. Convention designed to fight
such growth.'0 3 This is due to several factors in addition to the
obvious factor of the greed of the traffickers.
First, despite attempts 'to facilitate extradition through
current treaties, namely the Single Convention'0 4 and the 1988
U.N. Convention, 0 the successful extradition or prosecution
of international criminals remains a difficult and complex task.
The most obvious reason for states' general reluctance to sur-
render jurisdiction for a crime committed abroad is their na-
tional pride and sovereignty.' 0l The problem with this is that
the requested state may not be in a position to prosecute the
crime itself due to its own lack of commitment or the location
of witnesses and evidence abroad. 0 7 This lack of commitment
may be due to several reasons: perception of the offense as
not serious enough to warrant prosecution, intimidation by the
criminals' terrorist tactics, as with the narcotics traffickers in
War Against Drugs and Narco- Terrorism, 15 NOVA L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1991); Alan Cow-
ell, Inquiry into Sicilian Slaying Looks for Mafia Link to Colombian Drug Cartel, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1992, at A3 (reporting on possibility that top Italian prosecutor Giavanni
Falcone was murdered in response to investigation of Mafia and Colombian plan to
import cocaine to Europe); Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Indicts Colombians in '89 Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1992, at B3 (reporting that Pablo Escobar and Dandeny Munoz-
Mosquera of Medellin cartel charged with bombing Avianca airline jet); Stephen G.
Trujillo, Peru's Maoist Drug Dealers, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1992, at A25.
103. Joseph B. Treaster, Smuggling and Use of Illicit Drugs Are Growing, U.N. Survey
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at A 1l.
104. Single Convention, supra note 37, art. 36(2)(b).
105. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.
106. Patel, supra note 102, at 719-23.
107. Id. at 720-22.
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Colombia, 10 8 resentment harbored by the requested state to-
ward the requesting state asking the requested state to make a
major sacrifice (as with Latin American countries whose econo-
mies are based or influenced largely by the drug trade, and
where the requesting state provides such a demand for these
drugs that drug traffickers flourish in the requested states), 0 9
or disagreement between the requesting and the requested
state over whether a crime was in fact committed. A state, such
as Libya, may completely refuse to cooperate because of such a
disagreement. "10
Furthermore, the crimes covered by such extradition trea-
ties may become outdated due to the criminals' development
of new modes of operation."I ' For example, many states do
not yet allow drug-related offenses such as money laundering
or other economic crimes to serve as a basis for extradition." 1
2
Although the 1988 U.N. Convention sought to deal with this
108. There were some developments in Colombia such as the arrest of Pablo
Escobar, head of the Medellin Drug Cartel, and many of his associates. Reports of
his escape, however, and the egregious comforts that he enjoyed during incarcera-
tion, which allowed him to retain control of the cartel, quickly dampened hopes for
progress. See Around the World-Escobar's Prison Life, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1992, at A15
(reporting that Escobar indulged in pornographic movies, ordered jail guards
around, and ran his Medellin cocaine cartel by computer links); Around the World-The
Reward for Escobar, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1992, at A16 (reporting also that Escobar
has been charged with terrorism in bombing of Avianca Airlines jet); Don Podesta,
Escobar's Escapades Point Up Epic Colombian Drug Troubles, WASH. POST, July 30, 1992, at
A20 (commenting that Escobar's "ranch-jail," christened "The Cathedral" offered its
inmate many luxuries, humiliating Colombian government). As a result of the es-
cape, the U.S. government offered a US$2,000,000 reward for Escobar's capture; see
U.N. REP., supra note 102, at 38 (commenting on such narcotics traffickers' increasing
use of terrorism).
109. U.N. REP., supra note 102, at 37-39; Patel, supra note 102, at 718; see Tru-
jillo, supra note 102 (commenting that cocaine accounts for at least 35 to 45 percent
of Peru's export earnings).
110. See Qaddafi Rdects U.N. Demands on Bomb Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992,
at A13 (reporting that refusing to turn over suspects because of disagreement over
whether crime was committed); see also Ficconi v. Attorney General of the United
States, 462 F.2d 475, 478-79 (2d Cir.) (objecting to extradition because offense al-
leged committed not in extradition order), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1973); United
States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935) (allowing executive
decree to broaden reextradition capability).
111. Patel, supra note 102, at 726-27 (describing how new drug development
and law enforcement methods force constant updating of extradition treaties).
112. Id. at 728; ROBERT LINKE, EXTRADITION FOR DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES: A
STUDY OF EXISTING EXTRADITION PRACTICES AND SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR USE IN
CONCLUDING EXTRADITION TREATIES, at 29, 51-52, U.N. Doc. St/NAR/5, U.N. Sales
No. E.85.XI.6 (1985).
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problem, it still persists." 3 A state may also encounter great
difficulty apprehending a criminal and acquiring the evidence
that would permit the criminal's extradition or prosecution.
This may be a problem where a drug trafficker and his crops
are barricaded with military defenses in a remote area of the
country."l 4 Thus, numerous problems make extradition a less
than adequate means of dealing with complex international
crimes.
Second, the current international law enforcement system
is inadequate because clauses of conventions normally allow
signatory states to avoid certain provisions and even the con-
vention itself."5 As long as such "escape clauses" exist, these
international conventions cannot compel states to cooperate in
prosecuting international criminals who seek to hide behind
the veil of transnational borders.
Third, despite the existence of these treaties and Conven-
tions, the production of the narcotics crops continues to in-
crease."16 Thus, even as one country eradicates or reduces its
crops of coca or opium, another country takes its place to fill
the demand.' For example, Colombian drug lords shifted
from cocaine production to heroin production,"" while new
locations such as Africa and Chile emerge to grow and dis-
tribute cocaine, thus replenishing the international supply.' 19
Fourth, and most significantly, the international community
lacks any type of concrete enforcement mechanism. 2 0
Although the 1988 U.N. Convention allows disputes under the
113. Patel, supra note 102, at 728; LINKE, supra note 112, at 29, 51-52.
114. U.N. REP., supra note 102, at 37-39; Nathaniel C. Nash, Cocaine Invades Chile,
Scorning the Land Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at A4 (commenting that ease of
travel through borders exacerbates international enforcement problems).
115. E.g., 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6(6), 30, 32(4); Harding,
supra note 38, at 548-49.
116. See U.N. REP., supra note 102 (commenting on production of narcotics
crops); Joseph B. Treaster, Smuggling and Use of Illicit Drugs Are Growing, U.N. Survey
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at All.
117. U.N. REP., supra note 102, at 37-40; Nash, supra note 114 (noting that ease
of travel between Chile and Peru allows other nations to fill production voids);
Treaster, supra note 116.
118. Joseph B. Treaster, Colombia's Drug Lords Add New Product: Heroin for U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at Al.
119. Nash, supra note 114, at A4.
120. Harding, supra note 38, at 549; Jos6 A. Cabranes, International Law and Con-
trol of the Drug Trafficking, 7 INr'L LAw. 761, 764 (1973).
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Convention to be settled between the two parties in an agreea-
ble manner or by the International Court of Justice, it permits
a state to choose to avoid completely these methods of dispute
settlement, thereby allowing the dispute to remain un-
resolved.12 Moreover, while the International Narcotics Con-
trol Board can alert the parties or the U.N. General Assembly
of any non-compliance, it is only empowered to recommend an
embargo of the import or export of drugs from a particular
nation. 22 In actuality, the Board can do nothing to reprimand
a state for not cooperating with the terms of the 1988 U.N.
Convention or for assisting in narcotics trafficking or related
crimes. While nations can collectively apply economic sanc-
tions to punish a non-cooperating state, as is the case with
Libya,' 23 such an ad hoc approach does not provide a long-
term solution. A long-term solution requires an organized and
formal approach that empowers the international community
with strict enforcement mechanisms. A truly effective interna-
tional law enforcement system requires a structure that would
earn the trust of nations by being fair and neutral and that
would command the respect of the nations by strict enforce-
ment measures.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT WITH STRICT ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES
A realization of the shortcomings of the current status of
international law enforcement has led many, including promi-
nent U.S. law organizations such as the American Bar Associa-
tion and the New York State Bar Association, to propose or to
discuss the creation of some type of international criminal
court as a solution.' 24 The U.S. Congress, in the 1988 Anti-
121. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 32.
122. Harding, supra note 38, at 549; 1972 Protocol, supra note 42, art. 6(2). This
measure has never been imposed.
123. See supra note 4 (commenting that United Nations has imposed sanctions
against Libya for failure to produce Lockerbie bombing suspects).
124. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (1991) [hereinafter ABA REP.]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an
International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991); N.Y. STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT OF THE
COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LITIGATION SECTION (1991) [hereinafter NYSBA REP.];
BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1; FERENCZ, supra note 19; Anderson, supra note
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Drug Abuse Act, called for negotiations on the creation of an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over the prosecu-
tion of persons accused of international drug trafficking.' 25
The U.S. House of Representatives went further in 1989, and
stated that the United States "should pursue the establishment
of an International Criminal Court to assist the international
community in dealing more effectively with those acts of ter-
rorism, drug trafficking, genocide and torture that are con-
demned as criminal acts in the international conventions cited
in the preamble."'126 Such a court would serve the valuable
purpose of providing a neutral, international forum for the im-
partial prosecution of international criminals, and avoid the
problems stemming from the current ad hoc approach requir-
ing multilateral cooperation.
A. The Problems an International Criminal Court Would Address
An international criminal court would initially serve the
useful function of providing an alternative forum to nations re-
luctant to extradite a criminal to another nation with a differ-
ent criminal justice system for any of the reasons mentioned
3, at 433; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal, 15 NOVA L.
REV. 373 (1991) [hereinafter Bassiouni: Draft Statute]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal
Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27,
33-35 (1983); Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135 (1991); Patel, supra note 102;
Zagaris, supra note 102, at 719-20, 742, 744; A World Court for Drug Lords, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1992, at A22; Robert Dickson, Libya Case Shows Need for Terrorism Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at A34; Judith Miller, Moroccan King, A Friend of U.S., Rejects
Hard Line Toward Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at A7 (stating that King Hassan II
proposed an international criminal court to handle the terrorist cases against two
Libyan citizens).
125..See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
(1988) (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (containing language granting
President and Senate initiative to investigate establishment of international criminal
court, as well as strengthening reporting and monitoring requirements for financial
institutions); see also ABA REP., supra note 124, at 4 (advising formation of interna-
tional criminal court). This impetus may stem from criticism the United States has
received from the international community for its extraterritorial abductions of inter-
national drug traffickers and terrorists. See Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Ab-
ductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INr'L L. 151 (1991)
(describing how Camarena investigation and abduction of Alvarez-Machain and
others by U.S. agents violated traditional theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
126. H.R.J. Res. 66, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989); ABA REP., supra note 124,
at 4. The preamble refers to existing conventions involving air transportation, nar-
cotic drugs, and genocide. Id.
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above.'2 7 This would allow nations to circumvent the dilemma
of whether to use force to capture a wanted criminal in possi-
ble violation of national law, U.N. Charter norms, and interna-
tional human rights.' 28 Such a court would also provide for a
fair and neutral forum in which to try accused criminals when it
is not clear that the requested state-which under current ex-
tradition treaties may choose prosecution instead of extradi-
tion-would zealously or adequately prosecute them. 29 This
problem of the requested state's inadequate prosecution is ex-
acerbated when the accused wields power and influence in the
requested state or where the requested state lacks sufficient ev-
idence to prosecute effectively.
An international criminal court would also be useful where
two or more states have concurrent jurisdiction and cannot
agree on the correct forum state. Thus, where the accused has
committed several distinct offenses in two or more states that
constitute concerted criminal activity, an international criminal
court would more effectively consolidate all the charges in one
forum.' 30 An international criminal court could also be used
by states which do not have any extradition treaties. Such a
court would not offend the pride of a nation which chose not
to enter such treaties.
127. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text (discussing problems of in-
ternational law enforcement).
128. ABA REP., supra note 124, at 7. The arrest and seizure of Manuel Noriega
exemplifies the international illegality of such seizures. See generally Christopher A.
Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforce-
ment by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867 (1992) (explaining leeway of U.S. President to
use military force to effect an extraterritorial arrest). But see Abramovsky, supra note
125 (arguing that extraterritorial abduction by use of force violates international law
and provokes noncooperation from other nations). A recent example of this is the
U.S. abduction and U.S. trial of Alvarez-Machain, which created tension and mistrust
between the U.S. and Mexico. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992) (holding that if an extradition treaty does not prohibit abduction, then a forci-
bly abducted person can be legally tried in the U.S.); see also Tim Golden, Mexico Says
It Won't Accept Drug Aid From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, at A14; Linda Green-
house, High Court Backs Seizing Foreigner for Trial in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at
Al. The United States' resort to kidnapping undoubtedly grew out of the frustration
with extradition procedures. See Abramovsky, supra note 125, at 163 n.53 (explaining
proper method under international law of gaining jurisdiction over such a criminal).
It should be noted that under Alvarez-Machain, however, such abductions are not ille-
gal according to U.S. law.
129. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing lack of commitment
to current treaties).
130. Patel, supra note 102, at 733.
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An international criminal court would also facilitate the
discovery and evaluation of evidence located in different na-
tions.' 3' Such a court would encourage international coopera-
tion through the establishment of a uniform international
criminal code with a list of international crimes and punish-
ments, and rights for the accused which all signatory nations
would follow.' 32
Lastly, an international criminal court would provide a
structural vehicle by which a nation could pursue a decision to
prosecute suspected individuals, without that nation having to
resort to unilateral actions to enforce its prosecutorial deci-
sions. While the United States' building of a coalition to apply
pressure upon Libya by way of U.N.-imposed economic sanc-
tions t 33 is encouraging, such an approach was possible in this
instance only because of the relative strength of the United
States, in contrast to the weakness of Libya. Such an ad hoc
approach may not be possible in other cases where the balance
of power is not so decided. Economic sanctions proposed and
supported by an international criminal court or armed inter-
vention by an international agency would provide a fair and
neutral approach to the problem of a nation's lack of coopera-
tion and would not rely solely on one nation's superior eco-
nomic or military prowess.
B. Structure and Jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court
The structure of an international criminal court can be
modeled after the 1951 U.N. Draft Statute for an international
criminal court. 3 4 There have also been other draft statutes
and proposals since 1951. The most recent proposals include
drafts by the American Bar Association, 3 5 Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni t36 and Faiza Patel, who proposed a draft for an inter-
131. Id. at 736.
132. BASSIOUNI, DRAF-r CODE, supra note 1, at 41-59; NYSBA REP., supra note
124, at 6.
133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing failure of U.S. efforts to
rally international pressure against Libya).
134. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing 1951 U.N. Draft Stat-
ute).
135. ABA REP., supra note 124.
136. See BASSIOUNI, DRAFr CODE, supra note 1, at 215-52; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124.
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national narcotics court. 3
7
The most detailed of these recent drafts is the one set
forth by Professor Bassiouni. Professor Bassiouni postulates
an international criminal court that has jurisdiction over a
number of crimes listed in his proposed international criminal
code. 38 The court would consist of twelve judges of separate
nationality sitting in panels of three.'39 There would also be a
Procuracy divided into administrative, investigative, and
prosecutorial divisions and a Secretariat to perform adminis-
trative functions, prepare budgets, and publish annual re-
ports. 140 There would also be a standing Commission with
one representative from each state-party to mediate disputes
between state-parties, to propose international instruments to
enhance the functions of the court, and to facilitate compliance
with the 1988 U.N. Convention."'
The draft allows anyone to file a complaint with the
Procuracy (prosecutor) against a natural person for any one of
the enumerated crimes or for the Procuracy to initiate such a
complaint itself.142 The Procuracy would then investigate the
complaint and determine whether to proceed. 43  The
Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy would then have the
power to issue arrest warrants, subpoenas, injunctions, and
search warrants, as well as other warrants and orders in order
to assist in the development of a case. 144 Before proceeding to
trial, the court must find that the case is reasonably founded in
137. Patel, supra note 102, at 737-46.
138. See BASSIOUNI, DRAt-r CODE, supra note 1, at 115-77 (listing 22 international
crimes, including crimes of aggression, war crimes, anti-humanity crimes, racial
crimes, terrorist crimes, drug offenses, as well as numerous other crimes and of-
fenses); see also Bassiouni, Draft Statute, supra note 124, at 391.
139. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 236-38; see supra Bassiouni, Draft
Statute, supra note 124, at 408-10 (providing that Judges could not be of same nation-
ality and would be elected in brackets of four-year, six-year, and eight-year terms with
four judges for each term).
140. BASSIOUNI, DRIAvr CODE, supra note 1, at 239-40; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 411-12.
141. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 241-42; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 413-14.
142. BASSIOUNI, DRAt-r CODE, supra note 1, at 226-28; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 396-98.
143. BASSIOVNI, DRAr CODE, supra note 1, at 226-28; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 396-98.
144. BASSIOUNI, DRAr CODE, supra note 1, at 229; Bassiouni, Draft Statue, supra
note 124, at 399.
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fact and law and that adjudication would be fair and reason-
able. 145 If the court finds the case can proceed, the case would
then be heard by a Chamber of three judges. 146 The court
would deliberate after hearing the case and render a verdict
and a sentence from which both sides would have a right to
appeal. 147 If the defendant's guilt is found and upheld, the
court could then call upon any state-party to impose the sen-
tence.148
During the course of the proceedings, the accused would
be entitled to certain basic rights including the presumption of
innocence, procedural rights to confront witnesses and present
evidence, the right to a speedy trial, the right to question the
legality of the obtainment of the evidence, the right to remain
silent, the right to counsel, the right to know the charges, and
the right to question whether the charges are supported by
reasonable grounds. 149 The defendant would also have the
right to be present at and to participate in the proceedings, as
well as to have counsel present.' 50
The American Bar Association Task Force on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court provides for a similar structure.'' Un-
like Professor Bassiouni's proposal, the American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force favors a system of concurrent jurisdiction that
depends upon the consent of both the state where the crime is
allegedly committed and the state of which the accused is a
national. 152 The Task Force also sets forth four alternatives
145. BASSIOUNI, DRAFTr CODE, supra note 1, at 229; Bassiouni, Draft Statue, supra
note 124, at 399.
146. BASSIOUNI, DRAFTr CODE, supra note 1, at 231-32; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 402-03.
147. BASSIOUNI, DRAr CODE, supra note 1, at 233-34; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 404-06 (stipulating that prosecutor can appeal only questions of
law while defendant can appeal questions of fact as well as law).
148. BASSIOUNI, DRAFr CODE, supra note 1, at 235; Bassiouni, Draft Statute, supra
note 124, at 407.
149. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 245-47; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124, at 417-19.
150. BASSlOUNI, DRAFrr CODE, supra note 1, at 245; Bassiouni, Draft Statute, supra
note 124, at 417.
151. ABA REP., supra note 124.
152. Id. at 12. One member of the Task Force disagrees and proposes that only
the nation where the crime is alleged to have been committed need ask the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction since many nations condone and sometimes encourage law-
lessness. Id.
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for the scope of an International Criminal Court. 5 3 The three
possibilities are jurisdiction along the lines proposed by Pro-
fessor Bassiouni (an international criminal code), jurisdiction
limited to international drug trafficking and other international
crimes in which there is widespread agreement on the need for
their prosecution and punishment, and jurisdiction limited to
crimes over which each state would be willing to give the court
jurisdiction. 54
The Task Force provides for judges to be elected by the
state-parties.1 5 It also provides for an independent prosecu-
tor's office with subpoena powers and mutual legal assistance
treaties to ensure the cooperation of the member states. 56
The Task Force further provides for an investigatory magis-
trate to perform functions similar to those of a U.S. grand
jury.15 7
The Task Force leaves to the states the negotiation of the
necessary contents of an indictment, the role of the judges and
the prosecutors, the rights of the defendants, the admissibility
of evidence, the voting procedures for the judges, and other
aspects of trial procedure.' 5 8 The Task Force also provides for
certain rights for the accused, including the right to interro-
gate witnesses and inspect evidence, to adduce oral and other
evidence, to receive the court's assistance in obtaining relevant
material, to be heard by the court, and to decline to testify and
have no negative inferences drawn from the failure to tes-
tify.' 59 It also gives the International Criminal Court the
power to issue arrest warrants, to require the presence of wit-
nesses, and to impose sentences specified in a schedule of pen-
alties listed in the court's statutes. 60 The sentence would be
served in the country where the offense was committed.' 6 '
A third proposal, provided by Ms. Faiza Patel, is for the
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id. at 14-15.
155. Id. at 17.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. The Task Force also mentions the Nuremberg Trials as a practical
guide for resolving these issues. Id.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 22-23. The penalties imposed would be severe but would not include
the death penalty. Id.
161. Id. at 23.
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creation of an international narcotics court.162 This court
would have jurisdiction when the state where a person accused
of an international narcotics offense is located requests that
such person be brought under the jurisdiction of the court. 63
The court would then apply the law of the state where the al-
leged offense was committed." Ms. Patel's proposal mainly
adopts Professor Bassiouni's International Criminal Code.'6 5
Ms. Patel's court would consist of fifteen judges with
chambers of three. 66 Each state-party would nominate two
judges for a four-year term and the judges would take turns
serving.167 There would also be an Office of the Prosecutor
General consisting of an administrative division, an investiga-
tive division, and a prosecutorial division. 68 Also, a Commit-
tee of Parties would be the main administrative body of the
court with a member representative from each party.' 69 The
Committee would appoint judges and the Prosecutor General,
as well as create a budget for the court.170
Under this proposal a state-party would notify the Prose-
cutor General of its intention to send the accused before the
court.' 7' The Prosecutor General would then review the evi-
dence and decide whether there is a reasonable basis to believe
that the accused has committed a crime. 72 If the Prosecutor
General were to decide that there was sufficient evidence, then
he or she would bring the case to the attention of the President
of the Court, who would then conduct a preliminary hearing to
determine whether prima facie evidence exists. 1M This propo-
sal also provides for the parties' full cooperation with the
court's requests and judicial proceedings, and with the execu-
tion of sentences.174
162. Patel, supra note 102.
163. Id. at 741.
164. Id. at 742-43.
165. See generally BASSIOUNI, DRAFr CODE, supra note 1; Bassiouni, Draft Statute,
supra note 124.
166. Patel, supra note 102, at 739.
167. Id. at 739-40.
168. Id. at 743.
169. Id. at 744.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 742, 744.
174. Id. at 742, 745. For purposes of the execution of sentence, the Court shall
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The actual structure of an international criminal court
would obviously be negotiated by the various civil law and
common law nations and would probably be very similar to the
above-mentioned proposals. It would no doubt include rules
of procedure and evidence, the structure of the panels of
judges, 75 and rights for the accused as well as the victim, 76
What would arguably be the more difficult issue to be resolved
is the scope of the court's criminal jurisdiction, and its means
of obtaining this jurisdiction.
As previously mentioned, it would be more feasible for an
International Criminal Court to have jurisdiction over interna-
tional crimes such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and certain
economic crimes where wide-spread international agreement
exists on the need to cooperate in prosecution. 77 Such juris-
diction would circumvent or, at the very least, minimize the
problems encountered previously by avoiding jurisdiction over
crimes perceived as political or crimes involving "aggres-
sion." 178
The other question remaining is whether the consent of
both the accusing nation and the nation harboring the accused
would be necessary for the International Criminal Court to
maintain jurisdiction. Requiring the consent of the nation har-
boring the accused would present some of the same problems
that weaken extradition. 7 9 Influential narcotics traffickers and
terrorists could intimidate the nation and prompt it to deny
International Criminal Court jurisdiction and instead have a
sham trial or no trial domestically. On the other hand, how-
ever, if the International Criminal Court is granted jurisdiction
give preference to the party of which the convicted person is a national and then to
the party in the territory of which the offense was committed. Id. at 745.
175. There would be no right to a jury due to the international nature of the
case and the impracticability of obtaining jurors.
176. The prosecutor can be a separate international prosecutor-such as Profes-
sor Bassiouni's Prosecutor General-or can be the prosecutor the complaining na-
tion chooses to prosecute the case. The better alternative would be to have an in-
dependent prosecutor who would be more able to appear objective and gain the trust
of all of the nations involved.
177. See supra note 1 (illustrating international concurrence of such a court's ju-
risdiction over certain traditional international crimes).
178. See supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text (describing attempts to create
drafts for an international criminal court).
179. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text (describing current inade-
quacies in international law enforcement).
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without such a nation's consent, the problem arises over how
to compel a recalcitrant nation to surrender the accused.
A solution to such a problem is the application of eco-
nomic sanctions. The United Nations is currently applying
economic sanctions against Libya in order to force Libya to
surrender the two suspects which the United States has in-
dicted for the Lockerbie bombing.8 ° The International Crimi-
nal Court (which presumably will be part of the United Nations
or affiliated with it)' 8 ' could use the U.N. Security Council as a
means of enforcing its decisions. When a nation refuses to co-
operate, the appropriate official could go to the U.N. Security
Council and request that economic sanctions be applied to en-
courage cooperation. Furthermore, should economic sanc-
tions prove ineffective-as was the case with Iraq after Iraq in-
vaded Kuwait-then a U.N. or International Criminal Court
police force could enter the nation, arrest, and remove the ac-
cused.
Such a police force would consist of law enforcement offi-
cials supplied by each nation. The number provided by each
nation could be on a voluntary basis or proportionate to the
size or wealth of the nation. With the important exception that
such a police force would have the ability and power to enter a
nation and remove wanted persons where authorized to do so
by the United Nations, the police force could function in much
the same way as, or in conjunction with, Interpol. s2
While it can be argued that a situation such as the one with
Libya can be handled just the way it is currently being handled,
without an international criminal court, this is so only so long
as the United States maintains its current status as the only ma-
jor world power. History teaches us that a nation can be a ma-
180. See supra note 4 (describing U.N. sanctions against Libya).
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 18. An international criminal court formally incorpo-
rated as a part of the United Nations would require a vote of two-thirds of the mem-
ber nations. Id.
182. Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) is an interna-
tional organization consisting of delegates from the participating nations whose aims
are to ensure and promote cooperation between all criminal police authorities and to
establish and develop all institutions which will assist in preventing and suppressing
crimes. MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINALJUSTICE 185 (1989) (construing THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERPOL arts. 2(a)-
(b) (stating the aims of Interpol)).
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jor world power for only so long."" The United States should
take advantage of its current status to set up a more stable
world order which would survive after its power of supremacy
declines. Such an ad hoc approach as with Libya is not a feasi-
ble long-term solution for dealing with nations which do not
cooperate in efforts of international law enforcement. A long-
term solution requires the establishment of an international
structure with the trust and faith of the international commu-
nity.
While such a measure may seem drastic, the alternative is
to have an international community where nations may choose
to harbor persons accused of serious and sometimes heinous
crimes. These international criminals would then be able to
evade justice and continue their alleged lawless and harmful
activities. The United States should use its current position of
strength to promote the creation of such a court. This oppor-
tunity, which currently exists, may not exist again for centuries
to come.
While it may also be difficult to have a sufficient number of
nations agree to such an arrangement, it is certainly worth the
effort. Such an international criminal court would unify the in-
ternational community to more effectively combat serious in-
ternational crime. Such a court could also expand over time to
adjudicate a wider array of international crimes, including for
instance, environmental pollution, human rights violations, ge-
nocide, and even warfare.' 8 4
CONCLUSION
There is currently an opportunity to take a major step to-
ward a more orderly international community with greater re-
spect for the law. The international community must do more
to prevent the ravaging local effects of international crimes.
Education, although necessary to combat drug abuse, alone is
not enough. An international effort is needed to curb the pro-
duction and world-wide distribution of these drugs. While the
183. See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS:
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (analyzing
powerful nations' expansion and subsequent retrenchment, hypothesizing that he-
gemony can be maintained for only so long).
184. See BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 41-59 (proposing list of crimes
that international criminal court should have jurisdiction over).
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1988 U.N. Convention initiated such an international effort, it
has proved ineffective, ' 85 due mainly to the enormous amounts
of wealth and influence possessed by the international drug
traffickers and by nations' economic reliance upon drug
crops. 18 6 Unfortunately, a more binding, concerted, and force-
ful effort is needed. An international criminal court, fully em-
powered with strict enforcement capabilities, is the interna-
tional community's best response. Such a court could also
prosecute terrorists who often go unpunished for the heinous
crimes they commit. It could also have jurisdiction over vari-
ous economic crimes, including money laundering, to better
combat such crimes in a rapidly expanding and complex inter-
national economic community ripe with opportunities for
fraud and deceit.
The time has arrived for an international criminal court.
The 20th century has seen a tremendous growth in interna-
tional organizations which attempt to establish a more orderly
and peacefully coexistent international community. As the in-
ternational community becomes more integrated, so too does
the level of international crime increase. Unless this problem
is brought under control, the international community will be-
come more lawless and less orderly. An international criminal
court with the ability to enforce its decisions would curb and
reduce the growing level of international crime. It would pro-
vide a means for nations to combat the scourge of today's in-
ternational crimes and help bring about a more orderly world
with greater respect for the law.
185. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text (describing inadequacies of
current system of international law enforcement).
186. Id.; see also Michael Wines, Drug War to Widen on Same Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1992, at A9 (reporting that Peru's President, Alberto K. Fujimori, has stated
that in order to curb production of coca, a large influx of money is needed to allow
people growing the coca to change to a different crop). Furthermore, to offset the
devastating effects a powerful international criminal court would have on nations
which are producing drugs and to some extent rely on their drug crops for economic
stability, there would have to be a significant amount of financial and technical assist-
ance in order to help them change to other crops. This assistance would also reduce
the likelihood of a relapse to drug crops by any of these nations.
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